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INSURANCE
Excess Liability Resulting From the Use of a Non- Waiver
Agreement On An Insurance Contract Allegedly Void Ab Initio.
In Milbank Mutual Insurance Company v. Schmidt,' the insured filled out an application for liability insurance coverage
which contained material misrepresentations. He in fact had
a glass eye, had been canceled by other carriers, and had had
a previous recent accident. A policy was issued based on the
application and an accident occurred shortly thereafter. A
judgement rendered in favor of the third party resulted in
liability by the insurer of an amount in excess of the policy
limits.
When the company's investigation revealed the material
misrepresentations, the home office wrote to its agent indicating its desires that the agent cancel and pick up the policy.
Before the agent had an opportunity to act, the accident
occurred.
In light of the misrepresentations, the company proceeded
to investigate under a non-waiver agreement. The injured
party offered to settle, within the policy limits. The company
realizing this to be a reasonable offer indicated its willingness
to settle if the insured would secure its payment pending the
outcome on the issue of the validity of the insurance contract.
The insured refused, and judgement was ultimately rendered
against him in excess of the policy limits.
The jury, in considering the contract issue, found that the
company was liable for the limits of the policy for its failure
to cancel within a reasonable time, and also liable for the
excess on the ground that its failure to settle within the limits
was "bad faith".
What legal justification do the Courts point to in allowing
one the benefits of a contract obtained by false representation?
Clearly the company acted with reasonable dispatch in writing
to the agent of its findings, and requesting him to pick up the
1 304 F.2d 640 (8th Cir. 1962).

19631

CASE COMMENTS

policy. The weight of authority allows the jury to decide what
is a reasonable length of time in effecting cancellation. Two
days had elapsed from the time that the company became aware
of the misrepresentations until the accident occurred, and the
company had already put into motion correspondence to effect
cancellation. Where then, the unreasonable delay?
The company apparently made two errors; (1) issuing a
policy prior to verification of the statements of the application, (2) failure to reject immediately the application upon
finding the material misrepresentations.
The issuance of the policy implies that coverage is in
force. If any good reason should later come to light to warrant
a cancellation, the company may cancel the existing coverage.
The company assumes the risk of having to cancel a policy
once issued rather than to reject the application before issuing
the policy, and after a routine investigation on the application
is made. Once it is established that there is a policy in force,
the material misrepresentations render the policy voidable
rather then void.
The Court determining that the policy was in force looked
at the letter of the company to its agent and interpreted the
letter as an indication of its desire to cancel, not that it then
and there did in fact cancel. Once it was recognized that the
policy was in effect the termination of the coverage was subject to ten days advance notice, bringing it well within the date
of the accident. This seems to have been the sufficient grounds
on which the jury found a valid contract.
The finding of "bad faith" on the part of the company,
and holding it to excess liability is even more difficult to comprehend. To justify a recovery of a judgement in excess of the
policy limits, the insured is held to a high degree of proof,
to show fraud or bad faith on the part of the insurer. 2
The company's position after the accident seems obvious.
They felt that the policy was void ab initio, because it was
2 Lemmons v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 171 F.Supp. 92 (E.D. Ky. 1959).
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obtained by false representations.3 Because they are later
found to be in error as to their position, can this be held as
bad faith? Something more than a mere error in judgement is
necessary to constitute bad faith, and the insurer cannot be
required to predict with exact certitude the result of a closely
contested lawsuit.4
The gift of prophecy has never been
bestowed on ordinary mortals, and as yet their vision has not
reached such a state of perfection that they have the power to
predict what will be the verdict of a jury-.s Insurers have
been deemed to be free of bad faith in refusing to settle where
there is considerable evidence of collusion and failure to
cooperate, 6 a most serious violation, as well as minor violations, such as, where the insured has neglected to notify the
company of a changed address and paying the higher premium.? It would seem evident that the insured in this instance fell somewhere between these two extremes, and that
the company's failure to settle should not be deemed "bad
faith".
Is the company acting in "bad faith" when it admits that
an offer of settlement is reasonable and asks the insured to
secure any payment that it might make after advising him that
it considers that the insurance contract may ultimately be
found void? Although there is some conflict as to whether
paramount consideration should be given to protect the
insured8 or the insurer,9 as a test of "bad faith", the great
weight of authority takes the position that the insurer must
give equal thought to the end that both the insured and the
3 Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Pratt, 130 Cal. App.2d 151, 278 P.2d 489

(1959).
4 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4712 (1962).
5 Georgia Casualty Co. v. Mann, 242 Ky. 447, 46 S.W.2d 777 (1932).

6 State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. of Columbus, Ohio v. York, 104 F.2d 730 (4th
Cir. 1939).
7 Kleinschmidt v. Farmers Mutual Hail Assn. of Iowa, 101 F.2d 987 (7th
Cir. 1939).
8 Tygers River Pine Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 170 S.C. 286, 170 S.E.
346 (1933).
9 Wisconsin Zinc Co. v. Fidelity and Casualty Co., 162 Wis. 39, 155 N.W.
1081 (1916); Hilker v. Western Auto Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1, 231 N.W.
257 (1930); American Fidelity and Casualty Co. v. G. A. Nichols Co.,

173 F.2d 830 (1949).
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insurer shall be protected.'" "Bad faith" on the part of the
insurer would be an intentional disregard of the financial
interest of the insured, in the hope of escaping the full responsibility imposed upon it by the policy." It would seem
apparent that the company did give equal consideration to
both interests in suggesting the settlement and asking for
security. Certainly there was no intentional disregard of the
insured's financial interest.
Where then the "bad faith"? Is the Court's keen sense of
justice dulled by the deep pockets of the insurance company?
It would at first seem so.
Notwithstanding the very strong foregoing arguments, the
Court very properly looked at two acts of "bad faith" on the
part of the insurer in holding it responsible for the excess
liability. The company said that no coverage was in force
due to the false representations, and that it was therefore
cancelling the policy. How can it cancel that which it deems
to be void ab initio? In proceeding with the investigation of
the accident, the company operated under a non-waiver
agreement. How can it say, "We by the operation of the nonwaiver agreement do not waive any of our rights under the
contract", and in the same breath say "there is no contract"?
Herein lies the "bad faith" for which the Court found the company answerable in an amount in excess of liability provided under the policy.
Where the company assumes the position that one of the
terms or conditions of the policy has been violated, the use of
the non-waiver agreement seems perfectly acceptable. Where,
however, the company alleges that there is no policy in force,
because it was void ab initio, the use of the non-waiver would
tend to destroy rather than to protect its rights, by admitting
that the policy does exist. 12
National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Britt, 203 Okl. 175, 200 P.2d 407 (1948).
11Johnson v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co., 109 Vt. 481, 1 A.2d 817
(1938); APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4712
(1962).
12 Western Casualty and Surety Co. v. Herman, 209 F.Supp. 94 (E.D. Mo.
1962)-"The non-waiver agreement includes a paragraph which makes
it dear that the policy is to remain in force, since the Company ex10

pressly refuses to waive any of its defenses . . . Under the agreement it

seeks to affirm and disaffirm at the same time. It cannot do this."
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In this era of high pressure selling of insurance through
the media of radio, T.V. and news periodicals, the keynote
has been "low rates and fast efficient service". In many instances, policies are issued within twenty four hours of
the receipt of the application at the company home office. Just
as frequently, policies are issued immediately by the local agent
when the application is made out. In their zealous efforts to
remain competitive in this highly competitive business, they
seem to have lost sight of the very purpose the application is
intended to serve.
Companies issuing policies prior to investigations bear
the burden of having to cancel the coverage issued to unacceptable drivers. They also run the risk of being exposed to
a claim during the time it takes to effectively cancel the
coverage.
In view of the apparent attitude of the Courts, a reasonable
approach would seem to suggest no issuance of a policy until
it is determined that the applicant is acceptable. If not acceptable then insurers need only to reject the application. This
would not require cancellation for there is nothing to cancel.
A.T.

